

Message Text

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SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT ELMO R. ZUMWALT JR. OP-ED PAGE COLUMN, NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 21, HEADED "LEARNING FROM ARMS TALKS WITH THE SOVIET."
2. THE RECENT LAMENTS BY SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER ABOUT THE FAILURE OF CONGRESS TO SUPPORT HIS COVERT POLICY IN ANGOLA ADDS TO THE EVIDENCE THAT HE FAILS TO UNDERSTAND HOW POLICY MUST WORK IN THIS DEMOCRACY.
3. BY FAILING TO REPORT ACCURATELY SOVIET CONDUCT THAT IS CONTRARY TO BOTH THE CONCEPT AND THE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS OF DETENTE, INCLUDING THE STRATEGIC-ARMS-LIMITATION AGREEMENTS, HE HAS CREATED A EUPHORIA CONCERNING THE STATE OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND UNITED STATES.

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4. BY STRIVING TO DEAL WITH THE SYMPTOMS OF THE DISEASE IN

ANGOLA INSTEAD OF DEALING WITH THE DISEASE (SOVIET POLICY OBJECTIVES) ITSELF, MR. KISSINGER INSURES THAT THE DISEASE WILL FLOURISH--THAT IS, THAT SOVIET MISCONDUCT WILL INCREASE AND PROLIFERATE IN OTHER AREAS AND WITH RESPECT TO OTHER

POLICY INTERESTS, UNCHECKED BY REALISTIC UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION.

5. ONE AREA OF RECENT DEBATE, THE QUESTION OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE FIRST AGREEMENT ON LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS AS IT WAS EXPLAINED BY MR. KISSINGER AND GOVERNMENT WITNESSES TO THE CONGRESS--VIOLATIONS OF THE DEAL CONGRESS THOUGHT IT WAS APPROVING--IS BECOMING CLEARER TO THE PUBLIC.

6. IN VIEW OF THE IMMINENT PROSPECT OF ANOTHER STEP BEING TAKEN IN THE MARCH TOWARD A SECOND STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT AS A RESULT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S CURRENT TRIP TO MOSCOW, THE TIME HAS COME TO RAISE THE DEBATE OVER THE ARMS TALKS TO THE RELEVANT ISSUE: WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE DISASTER OF THE EARLIER INTERIM AGREEMENT THAT CAN BE OF USE TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC AND THE CONGRESS IN APPROACHING THE PROSPECTIVE NEW PERMANENT AGREEMENT?

7. THE CONTINUING SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION IS A CAUSE FOR GRAVE NATIONAL CONCERN.

8. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE UNITED STATES OBJECTIVE IN STRATEGIC-ARMS-CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION BE STABILIZATION OF NUCLEAR-ARMS COMPETITION ON A BASIS THAT WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING OUR SECURITY INTERESTS.

9. THIS MEANS INSURING THAT ANY AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED PROVIDE FOR ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN STRATEGIC-FORCE CAPABILITIES AND KEEP OPEN TO THE UNITED STATES THOSE RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OBJECTIVES THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO INSURE CONTINUING EQUIVALENCE OVER THE LONG TERM IN COMPETITION WITH A CLOSED SOCIETY THAT PLACES A HIGH PREMIUM ON THE ACQUISITION OF SUPERIOR UNCLASSIFIED

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MILITARY POWER.

10. WE MUST UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES AVOID A REPETITION OF OUR EXPERIENCE IN THE FIRST ARMS-LIMITATION AGREEMENT IN WHICH NEGOTIATIONS AGAINST A DEADLINE PRODUCED TECHNICALLY IMPRECISE AGREEMENTS THAT HAD SERIOUSLY DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS ON OUR SECURITY.

11. RECENT ARGUMENTS OVER THE NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES TO HAVE A STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE, AND WHETHER OR NOT TO MAKE ROOM FOR THIS MISSILE BY ADDING TO THE 2,400 STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES THAT EACH SIDE AGREED TO AT VLADIVOSTOK, SUGGEST THE NEED FOR TIME FOR ADDITIONAL PUBLIC DEBATE ON THIS ISSUE BEFORE ANY DEAL IS SIGNED.

12. ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED MUST BE COMPETENTLY DRAFTED AND CLEAR ON ALL SIGNIFICANT PARTICULARS, LEAVING NO ROOM FOR EVASION OR CIRCUMVENTION. IN ADDITION, THEY SHOULD BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

13. IN THIS RESPECT, THE SOVIET UNION'S ABILITY TO EVADE THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTENT OF THE 1972 AGREEMENTS BY DEPLOYING LARGE NUMBERS OF MUCH HEAVIER MISSILES, THE SS-19; THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTING SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES UNDERSTANDING OF THE ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE TREATY'S PROVISIONS RELATING TO AGREED

ABM TEST RANGES AND TO THE TESTING OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AS ABM SYSTEMS; AND SOVIET USE OF DECOYS AND CAMOUFLAGE TO INTERFERE WITH UNITED STATES NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION PROVIDE AN OBJECT LESSON TO THE DRAFTERS OF ANY FUTURE ARMS-CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

14. PAST PERFORMANCE MAKES IT CLEAR THAT TO CONTINUE SHIFTING THE STRATEGIC BALANCE TO ITS ADVANTAGE THE SOVIET UNION CAN BE COUNTED ON TO EXPLOIT EVERY WEAKNESS OF THE STRUCTURE, LANGUAGE AND ENFORCEABILITY OF SUCH AGREEMENTS.

15. I BELIEVE IT IS OF THE GREATEST NATIONAL IMPORTANCE THAT THE PRESIDENT FULLY INFORM THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC OF THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE STRATEGIC-ARMS UNCLASSIFIED

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AGREEMENTS AS THEY HAVE COME TO LIGHT THROUGH OUR OBSERVATIONS SINCE 1972 AND OF THE SOVIET ACTIONS THAT HAVE SUCCEEDED IN DEFEATING THE KEY OBJECTIVES THAT THE CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC WERE TOLD EARLIER HAD BEEN ACHIEVED BY THOSE AGREEMENTS.

16. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE FRANK IN DISCUSSING SOVIET CONDUCT THAT HAS BEEN INCONSISTENT WITH OUR LARGER EXPECTATIONS UNDER THE 1972 AGREEMENTS AND OF THE DETERIORATION IN UNITED STATES SECURITY THAT HAS RESULTED.

17. THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IS EQUALLY A SOURCE OF CONCERN. AS A RESULT OF CONGRESSIONAL CUTS IN THIS YEAR'S BUDGET, APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT WILL BE INADEQUATE TO CORRECT THE

DISADVANTAGEOUS AND ACCELERATING SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF
CONVENTIONAL FORCES, WHICH IN TURN POSES SUBSTANTIAL RISKS
TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD AND TO THE SECURITY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE.

18. IN THIS REGARD, RHETORICAL PLEDGES TO MAINTAIN A
DEFENSE SECOND TO NONE ARE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE FINANCIAL
RESOURCES ESSENTIAL TO MAKE THAT PLEDGE A REALITY. (END
TEXT) SISCO

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